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in the Federal Courts:
Appellate Deference or Review?
Federal courts, in complying with the Rules of Decision
Act, are often called upon to ascertain and apply state
law. In those cases where state law is unclear, both the
United States Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
on review give great weight to the district court judge's
interpretation of state law. The author of this Note ex-
amines the propriety of this policy of deference in light
of the function of the federal judiciary in ascertaining
state law as well as other principles of federal-state rela-
tions. He concludes that although the Supreme Court's
practice may be well-founded, the courts of appeals ought
to review independently the determination of state law
made by the district courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation of American juridical federalism, implementing
article MI, section 2 of the Constitution, is the Rules of Decision
Act:
That the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in
the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.'
Belying its significance, the act has been explicitly interpreted by
the Supreme Court but twice - in both cases the meaning of the
clause "laws of the several states" was at issue. Erie RI.R. v. Tomp-
kins,' overruling the near-century old Swift v. Tyson3 and dis-
pelling the notion of a federal common law, declared that "laws"
binds the federal courts to apply state decisional as well as statu-
tory law in cases where it applies. And, given the interstitial nature
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § s4, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (now 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1962)). Section 34 had remained virtually unchanged from 1789 until
1948 when "civil actions" replaced "trials at common law." The Revisor's
Note indicates that the purpose of the alteration was to insure the section's
applicability to equity cases, 28 U.S.CA. § 1652 (1950), although the act had
been so interpreted before the change, see Rublin v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
304 U.S. 202, 205 (1988).
2. 804 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (184-).
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of federal law,4 the Rules of Decision Act applies not only in
diversity cases but often in non-diversity cases too.' Thus, the
Rules of Decision Act - now the "Erie doctrine" - preserves the
state sphere within a single body of law by directing the federal
courts, where acting within that sphere, to administer state law.'
The often-overlooked bases of the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie provide a foundation for exploring the problems of federal
courts in administering state law.' The Court recognized that
4.
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a
legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal
systems of the states .... It builds upon legal relationships estab-
lished by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as nec-
essary for the special purpose.
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435
(1953); see Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REv. 489, 498, 504 (1954).
5. Although the clause "in cases where they apply" could be read to mean
"in diversity cases," it is clear that the act was intended to cover non-diversity
cases also. The members of Congress must certainly have been aware of the
concept of diversity jurisdiction, see U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2; Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789); TE FEDEiALIST No. 80, at 533, 534, 536,
537 (Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton); Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 56 (1923), so that if they
had meant to limit the act to diversity cases, they could easily have said so.
The language of the act is even more decisive: If the act were limited to
diversity cases, the carefully articulated exception to the general rule ex-
pressed in § 34 would itself become the general rule and federal law would
be applicable to all cases unless state law were expressly required. Since such
a general rule has never been expressed, the federal courts would have no
legislative guidance as to the rule of decision to be applied in non-diversity
cases. Further, the concept of a federal govrnment with limited powers, see
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 309 (Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton), is consistent with
providing for a broad range of applicable state law. The act has been applied
in non-diversity cases both before and after Erie. E.g., Wichita Royalty Co.
v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939); Mason v. United States, 260 U.S.
545 (1923).
6. Generally, the federal courts have accepted the obligation to admin-
ister state law in any case within a valid grant of federal jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has, however, impliedly excepted from the general grant of
federal jurisdiction certain cases where the Court felt that a unitary admin-
istration of the law was indispensable. Thus the Court recognizes a sphere
of jurisdiction reserved exclusively to the states, including administration of
estates, probating of wills, and matters of domestic relations. See generally
HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1001-18. Even where the right
has been susceptible of enforcement by federal courts, they have traditionally
abstained in favor of the states. See note 58 infra.
7. The first reason the Supreme Court gave for its decision was that
Swift v. Tyson had erroneously construed § 34. 304 U.S. at 72-73. The Court
based its conclusion on the recent "research of a competent scholar" who,
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Swiftv . Tyson had failed to attain its goal of a general common
law uniform throughout the country, because the state courts re-
fused to adopt federal rules of decision; as a result, Swift promoted
forum shopping between the state and federal courts within the
state's jurisdiction Another, and perhaps the most significant,
ground for Erie was that Swift . Tyson was "an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by courts of the United States."" Inherent
in the constitutional make-up of our federal system is the exclu-
sive power of the states to create substantive rights in those
areas where the federal government has not acted pursuant to its
limited grant,"0 and a federal common law dealing with those
rights in the federal courts in effect cripples the state jurisdictional
power.
In cases where the Rules of Decision Act requires a federal
court to administer state law and that state law is unclear, the
federal court is faced with a dilemma that necessarily raises diffi-
cult problems of federal-state relations. Adherence to the Erie
upon discovering Ellsworth's original draft of § 34, concluded that the word
"laws" was merely a concise expression intended to include both statutory
law and the unwritten or common law of the states. See Warren, supra note
5, at 81-88. But see Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Wearie Erie, 34 ConXExL,
L.Q. 494, 495-96 .(1949). This was not, -however, the motivating factor behind
Erie; the Court said that "if only a question of statutory construction were
involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century." 304 U.S. at 77.
8. 304 U.S. at 74-77.
9. 304 U.S. at 79, quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). Although the Court's opinion in Erie twice alludes to a constitu-
tional basis for the decision, 804 U.S. at 77-78, 79, the language has been re-
ferred to as improper, see 304 U.S. at 90-92 (Reed, J., concurring), or, at best,
mere dictum, see e.g., Bowman, Tie Unconstitutionality of th c Rule of Swift
v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. RPEv. 659 (1938); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson,
47 YA LJ. 1336 (1938). The Court has recently implied that Erie was con-
stitutionally based, see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 US. 198, 202 (1950),
however, the trend appears to be toward considering the doctrine as based
on policies reflected in the Constitution but not required by it. See, e.g.,
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945); HART & WEcinsLm, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 616-17, 633-35. But see Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution,, 53 Nw. UIL. Buv. 427, 541 (1958). The difference between the
latter two positions would be whether Congress is limited by policy or the
Constitution; or, phrased somewhat differently, whether the last word as to
rules of decision shall be that of Congress or the Supreme Court.
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 110 (1945). One early case suggested that the power of the states to
change the "general commercial law" was not only less than exclusive, but
that any attempt to make such a change binding on the federal courts "must
be nugatory and unavailing." Watson v. Tarpley, 59 US. (18 How.) 517, 521
1964]
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doctrine seemingly compels the federal court to follow strictly any
antiquated state court declaration without questioning its sound-
ness." Such an approach, however, would likely lead to forum
shopping between state and federal courts; it might also stimulate
the federal courts to read broadly the exception to the Rules of
Decision Act, thus narrowing the range of cases in which state
law applies,'2 perhaps ultimately to diversity cases. Yet, if the
federal courts were given free reign to interpret state law without
being bound by the declarations of the state judiciaries, a separate
body of federal law might be created within the state sphere of
applicable law, clearly contravening the principle of the Erie
doctrine.
Where the substantive rule of state law is unclear, the federal
courts are naturally faced with the problem of ascertaining and
applying the proper rule of decision. How the federal courts should
perform this duty has been the subject of many dissertations by
courts as well as legal scholars. 13 Once the trial court makes its de-
termination, however, the degree to which the litigating parties
are or should be bound by it is unsettled. This Note is concerned
with the problems arising out of deference by federal appellate
courts to determinations of state law by federal trial courts.
II. THE PRACTICE OF APPELLATE DEFERENCE
If a state appellate court is dissatisfied with a lower state
court's interpretation of state law, it does not hesitate to impose
its own interpretation on the parties as the rule of decision. So too
with a federal appellate court on a question of federal law. On
questions of unclear state law, however, federal appellate courts
are reputed to rely heavily on the opinion of the federal district
court judge. 4 The United States Supreme Court has unequivo-
cally stated that where there are no relevant state court decisions
it will "leave undisturbed the interpretation placed upon purely
(1855). But see Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 495 ,(1934): "What
was there said [in Watson] on the subject was unnecessary to the decision,
and has not been followed in later cases."
11. See Part IMl infra.
12. The federal courts have taken one small step in this direction with
respect to the law of unfair competition. See HEART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 809; Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction -Applicability of the Eric
Doctrine, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 543 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Dwyer, 822 U.S. 232 (1944); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot -
Extensions of the Erie Case, 81 Ky. L.J. 99 (194); Clark, State Law in Fed-
eral Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE J.
267 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YAx L.J. 762 (1941).
14. WYZANSKI, A TRiAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND REsPoNsmiLiTY 23 (1952).
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local law by a... federal judge of long experience and by three
circuit judges whose circuit includes [the state whose law is in
question]."' 5
Shortly after the Supreme Court stated this position, the Court
.of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit announced a decision summarily
accepting a district court's interpretation of unclear state law; 0
that interpretation was accepted because the court, on authority
of the Supreme Court's language, gave great weight to the opinion
of the district court.r Since then the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly
affirmed its decision not to change the district court's interpreta-
tion of state law unless convinced of error. 8 This has been true
even where the court recognized that the unclear state law lent
itself to-more than one permissible interpretation and that in its
opinion the interpretation chosen by the district court was not
the most convincing."9 The position of the Eighth Circuit has sub-
.sequently been adopted by many of the other circuits.20
- Implicit inthe Fie doctrine is the recognition that courts make
"laws?' Eaih- time a court, whether state or federal, speaks it not
only af ects the rights of the parties before it, but it also sets down
a rule by which prospective litigants might expect to be gov-
erned. Accepting the general principle of appellate review of these
"laws" as well-founded in policy, the proper degree of federal ap-
pellate deference to lower federal court determinations of state
law must, at least in part, depend on whether federal courts apply-
ing state law "make law" like other courts or whether they perform
. 15. MacGregor v. State INtut. Life Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942);
see Reitz v. Mealey, 314 US. 33, 39 (1941); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
16. Magill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 Fed 709 (8th Cir. 1943).
17.
The trial court, in the case at bar, believed that to be the law. In de-
ciding what the highest court of a -tate would probably hold the state
law to be, great weight may properly be accorded by this court to the
view of the trial court. This court would be justified in adopting a
contrary view only if convinced of error.
Id. at 713. (Citations omitted.)
18. See, e.g., Billings v. Investment Trust Co., 309 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1062);
Homolla v. Gluck, 248 F-ad 731 (8th Cir. 1957); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Powell, 177 F2d 660 (8th Cir. 1949); Russell v. Turner, 148 F-d 562 (8th
Cir. 1945).
19. See Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Barnett, 221 Fad 695 (8th Cir.
1955); Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1950).
20. See, e.g., Wisconsin Screw Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 297 F.2d
697 (7th Cir. 1962); Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 Fa2d 924 (6th Cir.
1960); Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 272 Fad 9159 (th Cir. 1959); Cran-
ford v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8 (1oth Cir. 1958); California
v. United States, 235 F-2d 647 (9th Cir. 1956).
1964].
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some other function. Thus, this Note will next consider the nature
of the federal judiciary's freedoms and responsibilities with respect
to ascertaining and applying state law; then the nature and scope
of appellate review will be examined in light of these considera-
tions and other principles of federal-state relations to evaluate the
propriety of appellate deference.
III. STATE LAW: THE FUNCTION OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS
One week after Erie was handed down the Supreme Court, in
Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co.,21 stated as a guideline in ad-
ministering state law that "the federal courts must now search
for and apply the entire body of substantive law governing an
identical action in the state courts. 22 The case suggests that the
federal courts should follow the same course in determining the
rule of decision to be applied to cases governed by state law as
in other cases - "the forum should use the very same juristic data
in determining the rights of the litigants, whether the forum be a
federal court or a state court.""8 But this approach was short-lived.
To avoid applying the "law of the state" as expressed by in-
ferior state courts, the lower federal courts often read the Su-
preme Court's language in Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l
Bank,,4 decided one year after Erie and Ruhlin, to say that lower
federal courts were to act as the highest court of the state; since
these state courts are not bound by lower state courts' interpreta-
tions of state law, the federal courts reasoned that they should
not be so bound either.2  Only two and one half years after Erie,
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field26 and its companion cases 27 pro-
21. 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
22. Id. at 209.
23. Corbin, supra note 13, at 774.
24. 306 U.S. 103 (1939).
25. E.g., Ilinois Cent. R.R. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1940);
Six Companies v. Joint Highway Dist., 110 F.2d 620, 626 (9bh Cir. 1940).
26. 311 U.S. 169 (1940). This case has a particularly interesting history
and is an excellent example of the absurd result that sometimes obtains from
"blindly adhering" to state law. The New Jersey legislature had recognized
the validity of the Totten trust by statute. However, two vice-chancellors
construed the statute out of existence. Travers v. Reid, 119 N.J. Eq. 416, 182
Atl. 908 (Ch. 1936); Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 408, 182
Atl. 912 (Ch. 1936). The federal court of appeals, reversing a district court
that had relied on the opinions of the lower New Jersey courts to declare the
Totten trust invalid, felt that since the highest court of the state had not
spoken, the statute still stood. Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d
521 (3rd Cir. 1939). The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
court of appeals -had failed to follow state law. Later, another vice-chancellor
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scribed this practice. Federal courts were not to sit as would the
highest court of the state, limited only by stare decisis, but were
bound by decisions of lower state tribunals, notwithstanding that
higher state courts were free to ignore them. Thus, the discretion
of ,the lower federal courts was severely limited by Field: For
purposes of ascertaining state law, the federal judiciary was rigid-
ly bound by the opinion of any state judge "who cares to express
himself.' "
One of the bases of the Eri decision was to prevent forum
shopping -where different rules of decision existed between state
and federal courts, a foreign litigant could pick the most advan-
tageous forum merely because of the fortuity of diverse citizen-
ship. Yet in some instances the restrictive Field doctrine merely
substituted one kind of forum shipping for another. If a foreign
litigant found a favorable state court decision, he would prefer
to bring his action in a federal court since that forum would be
bound to apply the declared law of the state; the state court, how-
ever, would be free to reverse or overrule the prior decision. Con-
versely, if the state court decisions were adverse to the foreign
litigant, he would prefer to bring his action in the state forum, for
the state courts could reexamine earlier decisions and refuse to
follow them.
Perhaps the primary problem, however, is the resulting second-
rate justice in the federal courts. Fundamental to the Erie doctrine
is the recognition that the judiciary is a source of law- courts,
as well as legislatures, make 'laws." Although legislatures have at
their disposal techniques for determining the most desirable social
policies, not all of which are available to the courts, the judiciaries
serve a complementary function by providing an agency that is
more readily accessible than the legislatures.2 A court, whether
federal or state, should be free to use its "judicial brains," limited
only by those doctrines, stare decisis for example, that have tradi-
tionally limited courtsY0 Forceful objections have been voiced
in New Jersey, deciding a case based on the statute, cited the federal court
of appeals decision as authority for his departure from the decisions of his
brethren. He noted that the case had been reversed, -but "on another point."
Hickey v. Kahl, 129 NJ. Eq. 233, 240, 19 A-2d 33, 38 {Ch. 1941).
27. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. Amer-
ican Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 US. 23 (1940); Six Companies v. Joint Highway
Dist., 311 U.S. 180 (1940).
28. Clark, supra note 13, at 290-91.
29. Hart, supra note 4, at 493.
s0. See Corbin, supra note 13, at 774-75. Even stare decisis allows the
overruling of prior decisions, and presumably the federal courts are at least




against the imposition upon the federal judiciary of a standard
of mechanical jurisprudence- a requirement that forces federal
judges "to abdicate [their] judicial functions and even prostitute
[their] intellectual capacities to discover not state law, but the
particular views a state judge may have uttered many years ago
under quite different circumstances"'"- in cases where state law
must be applied. To the extent that the federal courts are denied
the right to participate creatively in the development of the law.
not only is the philosophy of Erie ignored, but the litigants and
the law itself are doomed to suffer.82
There are intimations that the Supreme Court has relaxed its
requirement of strict adherence to state decisions, apparently in-
dicative of a feeling that the once hostile attitude of lower federal
courts towards the Erie doctrine has changed and that those
courts are capable of making a contribution to the law within the
limitations of the doctrine. In King v. Order of United Commer-
cial Travelers," the Court held, albeit in a labored opinion, that
federal courts were not bound by an unreported decision of a
"local" state court of nisi prius jurisdiction. The Court has also
used language indicating that state supreme court decisions may,
in effect, be ignored under certain circumstances. For example, in
Meredith v. Winter Havens4 the Court said that "the rulings of
the Supreme Court of Florida . .. must be taken as controlling
here unless it can be said with some assurance that the Florida
Supreme Court will not follow them in the future ... ."" Similarly,
in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.36 the Court said:
[Tlhere appears to be no confusion in the Vermont decision, no develop-
ing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones, no
dicta, no doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on
the question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the
judicial rule.3 7
But should the federal courts be limited to legislative develop-
ments, dicta, ambiguities, etc., where, as was the case in Bernhardt,
the state judiciary has not considered the rule for 50 years? If the
federal courts are to be truly free to use their "judicial brains,"
they should not, in such a case, be precluded from looldng to and
considering such factors as consensus of laws in other jurisdictions,
writings of legal scholars, etc.
31. Clark, supra note 13, at 291.
32. See Corbin, supra note 13, at 775-76; Hart, supra note 4, at 510.
33. 383 U.S. 153 (1948).
S4. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
35. Id. at 234. (Emphasis added.)
36. 350 U.S. 198 (1956), 45 CAMni. L. Rav. 87 (1957).
S7. 350 U.S. at 205.
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In so far as Swift v. Tyson resulted in subjecting the citizenry
of a state to "dual and often inconsistent systems of substantive
law," the doctrine was an "offense to the most basic concepts
of justice according to law""' At the expense of national uniform-
ity of rules of law, Erie and the Field line of cases attempted to
attain uniformity within each particular jurisdiction. Yet Field
resulted not only in a kind of forum shopping perhaps even more
deleterious than under Swift v. Tyson (because the result in the
federal court was more predictable), but also threatened the liti-
gants in the federal court with a second-rate type of justice39 If
Field is rejected and Meredith and Bernhardt are read broadly,
the problem of forum shopping would be eliminated.
I The final question, then, must be whether it is an offense to the
ideals of federalism for federal courts to administer a justice equal
to that available in state courts,40 a result likely to obtain from a
viable approach to state law in federal courts under Bernhardt
and Meredith. Would such an approach be any less of "an uncon-
stitutional assumption of powers" than Swift v. Tyson? Unlike
the situation existent under Swift, a decision based on the viable
approach to state law would utilize state-expressed premises.
Further, the rule of law derived by the federal court would be sub-
ject to being "overruled" by a subsequent state court decision; but
in the interim the state judiciary would have the benefit and
stimulation of the enlightened approach of an independent, yet
responsible, federal judiciary. The viable approach would not
yield either a double system of rules of substantive law or the
application of a sterile rule of law in the federal courts.
IV. TUE CASE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether the function of the federal judiciary acting within the
scope of the Erie doctrine is to adhere blindly to whatever declara-
tions of state law that might be available or to use its "judicial
brains" in determining the applicable rule of decision, the question
of the degree of judicial review or deference which should be ac-
corded that determination is presented. On such questions of un-
clear state law, federal appellate courts accord considerable weight
to the opinion of the federal district court judge4
The Supreme Court's policy of deference appears justifiable
because each year the Court is asked to decide more cases than it
38. Hart, supra note 4, at 505-06.
39. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
40. Of. Hart, supra note 4, at 518.
41. Wy a~sKi, op. cit. supra note 14.
42. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
1961] NOTE
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can possibly handle.4" Although the most important function of
the Supreme Court has often been said to be the construction and
application of the Constitution, 44 the Court is also asked to hear a
variety of other cases. As to the latter function, the Court should
certainly be free to limit the extent of its participation through the
use of certiorari; but in exercising both functions the Court must
be able to spend the necessary time to determine the perplexing
issues presented. It follows that the Court should be able to choose
to rely on the juristic ability of the lower federal courts to inter-
pret the law of a state without having to make a complete re-
examination itself, unless convinced of error. By leaving the final
responsibility for ascertaining state law to the lower federal courts,
the Supreme Court is, pro tanto, in a better position to adjudicate
those great issues of government which by their very nature re-
quire its consideration.
The policy underlying the review procedure used by the Su-
preme Court46 does not, however, justify deference to a trial court's
determination of state law by a court of appeals. The basic ra-
tionale for the Supreme Court's willingness to rely heavily on a
lower federal court's determination of state law is that the nature
of the task is neither so important nor so difficult as to warrant
Supreme Court consideration. 46 This rationale obviously does not
apply to the courts of appeals. Indeed, the Supreme Court's pro-
cedure implicitly requires appellate court review of a district court
determination of unclear state law, a fact which the Court has
expressly recognized.4
The parties to an action in the federal courts "have the right to
43. Concern over the pressure exerted on the Court's tLime and strength
was expressed at a time when a mere 539 petitions for certiorari were sub-
mitted. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNEL L.Q. 499, 504 (1928). During the 1961 Term,
the Court disposed of 1892 petitions for certiorari and 129 appeals, see The
Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 82 (1962), and during the
1962 Term, 1976 cases submitted for certiorari were disposed of while 185
cases arose on appeal, see The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HAM. L. REv.
62, 84 (1963).
44. See Frankfurter, supra note 43, at 502-06; Taft, Attacks on the Courts
and Legal Procedures, Ky. LJ., Nov., 1916, p. 18.
45. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 43 & 44 supra.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960);
Appalachian Power Co. v. American Institute of Certified Pub. Accountants,
361 U.S. 887 (1959); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944). The impli-
cation that review by the court of appeals is required exists, in the Supreme
Court's language, even if questions of state law are treated as "facts." The
Court has frequently referred to the "two-court rule"- findings of fact con-
curred in by two lower courts will be accepted by the Supreme Court unless
[Vol. 48:747
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have the judgment of the Court of Appeals" on the rule of deci-
sion,48 an independent interpretation of the state law by a court
of appeals. The Erie concept - of judiciaries being coordinate
organs of state power - itself prohibits the finality of the determi-
nations of a single district court; since each decision of a court is
"law," sound judicial policy requires that it be reviewable especial-
ly where the federal courts are permitted to exercise their "judicial
brains" in ascertaining state law. Limiting the scope of appellate
review in certain areas of the law is accepted, but for reasons found
in established policy. For example, the right to an appellate review
of questions of fact has been qualified because the finder of fact is
in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and is
in at least as good a position as an appellate body to draw infer-
ences. Similarly, most of the decisions limiting the scope of appel-
late review of questions of state law are couched in terms of the
reviewing court deferring to the opinion of the trial judge be-
cause of his experience with local law.49 Certainly a federal district
judge may be required to deal with the law of his state more fre-
quently than federal circuit court judges whose circuit includes
many states, yet this fact alone does not make him more expert in
the field. Arguably, the district judge is more familiar than the
circuit judges with the policies of the state in which he sits; but
those policies are no more than expressions embodied in the stat-
utes and decisions of the state, 0 and they are as readily available
to the court of appeals as they are to the district court. Even the
Eighth Circuit has appeared to recognize the need for an appellate
review in certain circumstances. 1
clear error is shown. See ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JRusrnIcTxoN oF THE SU-
PRFA COURT OF TEm "UiTED STATES § 333 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951).
48. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 212 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
49. E.g., MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 315 U.S. e8O (1942);
Ferran v. Illinois Cent. I.R., 293 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1901); Cranford v.
Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 261 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1958); California v. United
States, 235 F.d 647 (9th Cir. 1956).
50. See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) (Lehman, J.).
51. The "general rule" so often stated by the Eighth Circuit as the reason
for deferring to the opinion of the trial judge provides for reversal when the
appellate court is "convinced of error." See, e.g., Russell v. Turner, 148 F.ed
562 (8th Cir. 1945); Doering v. Buechler, 146 Fad 784 (8th Cir. 1945). In
Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 145 Fad 420 (8th Cir. 1944), the Eighth Circuit
reversed a district court ruling that special damages for fraud were not recov-
erable under Nebraska law. Although the question had never been decided in
Nebraska, and the case might therefore -have fallen within the class of cases
in which the Eighth Circuit has deferred to the judgment of the district
court, the court suggested that the district court erred in interpreting Ne-
braska cases that denied special damages to mean that only general dam-
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It should be recognized that most of the determinations of state
law by the federal courts are likely to be sound, and the results
reached by applying them to the causes pending are not likely to
be different from independent exercises of judgment by the state
courts even though there are certain to be cases like Field where
a different result would obtain.2 Yet, where parties are litigating
in an action before a federal court, they have but that single op-
portunity to be heard. If their day in court is to be at all mean-
ingful the litigation must be governed by the most proper rule of
law available. Erie decided that that rule was to be state law. If
an appellate court reviewing the case for errors dogmatically re-
ages were recoverable. The court of appeals said that "the situation seems
simply to be that the [Nebraska] Court never 'has been called upon to give
direct consideration to the question." Id. at 424. In both Anderson v. Sander-
son & Porter, 146 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1945), and 'Petsel v. Chicago B. & Q-R.R.,
202 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1953), the Eighth Circuit was confronted with infor-
mation on appeal that had not been presented to the district court - the
court was convinced that this new information warranted reversal. Arguably
the facts of each of these cases would have warranted reversal within the
language of the Eighth Circuit's "general rule." Yet, while in those cases
affirmed ,by the Eighth Circuit, the general rule is cited liberally, it was never
mentioned in these three cases reversed by the court. In none of the three
cases could the court of appeals say with certainty that their view of the
state law in question was the interpretation that the state would have
adopted; nor, in the many cases affirmed by the appellate court, could the
trial courts -have so claimed.
Petsel represents the type of case where the need for appellate review is
most obvious. The action was commenced in an Iowa federal district court
under an Illinois statute. Even assuming that the district court judge's fa-
miliarity with local law justifies the Eighth Circuit's policy of deference in
the usual case, it would certainly not suffice in a case like Petsel. An Iowa
judge is no more familiar with Illinois law or the policies underlying that
law than the judges of the court of appeals. Yet the court in Petsel indicated
that it would not review the determination of questions of law by the trial
court except to the extent that it was presented with legal material not called
to the attention of the lower court. 202 F.2d at 823-24.
52. A recent example was the extended litigation arising out of Nolan v.
Transocean Air Lines, 173 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Decedent's execu-
tor brought suit under the California wrongful death act on behalf of de-
cedent's wife and minor child. Under New York law the California one-year
statute of limitations was applicable. Prior California decisions had held that
although the statute of limitations might be tolled during the infancy of
the plaintiff, the wrongful death act created a joint cause of action for all
heirs and the 'bar of the statute of limitations as to one heir was a bar to all
other heirs. HIaro v. Southern Pac. R.R., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441
(1936); Sears v. Majors, 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 P. 321 (1936). On appeal from
a dismissal the Second Circuit said that its principal task was "to determine
what the New York courts would think the California courts would think
on an issue about which neither has thought" and held that the district court
had properly relied on California authorities, although there were other al-
fuses to reconsider the rule of law, the parties' day in court is not
meaningful. 3
Whether or not the court of appeals reviews the question of
state law, the determination of the federal court is not binding on
subsequent cases arising in state courts4 - to some extent, it is
not even binding on subsequent cases in federal courts" - and the
obligation of the federal courts under the Erie doctrine often in-
volves "guesswork."" These facts, however, should not preclude
the parties from having their controversy adjudicated under a rule
of decision derived by the body most capable of making the best
decision under the circumstances. The appellate court is composed
of a greater number of men of at least presumably equal com-
petence in precisely the same field as the district judge. Their
collective opinion as a panel is more likely to reflect "state law"
than the opinion of a single trial judge. The fact that Congress has
created courts of appeals with jurisdiction to review all final deci-
sions of the district courts reflects a strong policy, founded on the
belief that the decision of the appellate court is more likely to be
"correct," that the litigants should not be bound by the ruling of
the lower court. 57 The parties should not be deprived of being
governed by the best rule of decision under the circumstances
merely because the court hearing the case happens to be a federal
legedly inconsistent cases and the result in Haro had been severely criticized in
e5 CALiF. L. REV. 373 (1937). Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F-2d 280,
281 .(2d Cir. 1960). Prior to consideration by the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court of California decided Leeper v. Baltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.d 1-
(1960), in which it said "if the cause of action were a joint one, the statute
would -be toled as to both. 'If an action not severable is not barred as to one
of the parties on account of his infancy at the -time the cause of action arose,
it is not barred as to either of the other parties." Id. at 208-09, 347 P.2d at
2M (dictum). The Supreme Court remanded the ease to the court of appeals
for consideration in light of Leeper. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 US.
293 (1961) (per curiam). The court of appeals re-airmed the decision of the
district court. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 290 F2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961). The substantive question was finally settled con-
trary to the federal court's determinations by the California Supreme Court.
Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 36 Cal. Rep. 321 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1904), vacat-
ing 32 Cal. Rep. 504 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
53. See Corbin, supra note 13, at 775.
54. See Hart, supra note 4, at 501-02-; Note, Authority in State Courts of
Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 CoLUn!. L. REv. 943
(1948).
55. E.g., Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Strachan Shippimg Co., 301 Fa2d
741 (5th Cir. 1962).
56. Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951).
57. See Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries:
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HAv. L. REv. 70, 113 (1944).
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court required to apply state law. Furthermore, many state courts
often do look to federal decisions, and they should be able to rely
on the courts of appeals' decisions as embodying the best approach
to the state's law notwithstanding the fact that the state court is
free to reject it.
To refuse the litigants a right of review appears to be giving
questions of unclear state law the same place in the scheme of
appellate review as is commonly accorded questions of fact. Cer-
tainly, if the parties were in a state court, the law of the case
would be subject to review by a superior tribunal. The same holds
true where a federal question is presented in a federal court. Why
then, should this right be denied the parties merely because a
federal forum is deciding questions of state law?
CONCLUSION
The problems that attend the application of state law in federal
courts are a natural consequence of the Rules of Decision Act. In
seeking to preserve the sphere of state-created substantive rights
and to avoid forum shopping between state and federal courts,
while at the same time recognizing that federal courts are capable
of making a substantial contribution to the growth of the law
generally and that the litigants, too, have an interest in the action,
appellate review of federal district court determinations of state
law appears to be a desirable answer, although not the only one.",
The policy of deference to the opinion of the lower courts, al-
though sound at the Supreme Court level, cannot be justifiably
applied by the courts of appeals. Review, on the other hand, gives
full recognition to the Erie mandate that state courts be treated
as law-making organs of the states: The state decisional rule of
58. Although a discussion of the relative merits of the alternatives to
appellate review as a solution to the problems created as a result of states'
laws being applied in federal courts is beyond the scope of this Note, it should
be obvious that they do exist. For example, abolition of diversity jurisdiction
would certainly solve the bulk of the immediate problem. Also, increased use
of the abstention doctrine, see Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered,
37 TExAs L. REV. 815 (1959); Note, Judicial Abstention From the Exercise of
Federal Jmisdiction, 59 CoLum. L. REV. 749 (1959); Note, Abstention: An
Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. P,&. L. REv. 226 (1959), or the certification of
questions of doubtful state law to the state courts, see Kaplan, Certification
of Questions From Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court
and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAIi L. REV. 413 (1902);
cf. HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 444-47; Vestal, The Certified
Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REV. 629 (1951); Wolfson & Kurland, Certificates
by State Courts of the Existence of a Federal Question, 63 HAnv. L. Rsv. 111
(1949), might obviate the problem.
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law would be applied in federal courts as would any other rule.
Further, the party forced into federal court by the fortuity of
diverse citizenship would be assured of the same "day in court"
as he would have had if he were in a state court or in a federal
court applying federal law.

